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Abstract
Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric infor-
mation. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis.
This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing
certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the
product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private
information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buy-
ers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers
increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also
explained.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of third party certification on markets with asymmetri-
cally distributed information. We examine incentives of intermediaries regarding their
selling behavior and associated market outcomes. In general, different objectives for
the demand of certification exist on both sides of the market: for buyers and for sell-
ers. Sellers may profit from publicly announced certification as they can differentiate
themselves from lower-quality sellers in the market. Moreover, publicly available in-
formation on the quality leads to Bertrand-like price competition between buyers. In
contrast, buyers seek to obtain an informational advantage over their rivals through
private certification, as it allows them to extract an information rent. In the bidding
process of buyers, the informed party adjusts its offer depending on the certified quality.
Facing this tradeoff, we determine the optimal selling strategy of third party certifiers
and reveal the impact on gains of trade.
Certifiers are most prominently present in financial markets. These rating agencies
evaluate the creditworthiness of issuers as well as the quality of financial products.
Therewith, they reduce information asymmetries and increase efficiency in capital mar-
kets. Their main objective is the independent evaluation of the quality of a firm or
a sovereign regarding its debt servicing likelihood.1 The market dominating rating
agencies mainly rely on two business models: on the one hand, they offer their service
directly to sellers (issuer-pay model) and on the other hand, they sell to potential buy-
ers (investor-pay model).2 Despite the important role in financial markets, demand for
certification services also arises in various other product or service markets, such as the
markets for industrial products and second-hand automobiles.
We develop a model of certification in an asymmetric information framework and show
that a profit maximizing certifier sells its service to both sides of the market, to buy-
ers and to sellers. Following this strategy, it generates a double margin and increases
revenues compared to selling solely to one side of the market. In addition, we show
that welfare increases substantially through the operation of rating agencies in specific
1Cantor (2004) gives a brief overview on recent research on rating agencies, mainly with an em-
pirical focus.
2Three rating agencies share an estimated 95 % of the rating market, namely Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s Investors Services and Fitch Ratings. The markets for certification services achieved above
average growth rates in the last decades, as demand hiked due to the increased complexity of financial
products and the attached information asymmetries.
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markets as more trades are executed, which otherwise fall victim to asymmetrically
distributed information. Thereby, gains from trade heavily depend on the market
structure. We differentiate a lemon market as introduced by Akerlof (1970) and a
honey market where trades already occur without certification. In the former, the in-
termediary is partly able to overcome the breakdown of markets due to information
asymmetries.
In general, the credible assessment of products’ qualities allows to differentiate sellers
of low and high quality, which in turn leads to efficient quality related pricing. Hence,
issuers in the lemon market gain from the introduction of rating agencies. In markets
with efficient trades, ex ante, buyers and sellers do not favor the appearance of a rating
agency, as it reduces their potential gains from trade in equilibrium. Nevertheless, the
rating agency enters such markets and meets the demand by sellers and buyers, as it
allows pricing according to the actual quality of the product.
Related to the market of financial intermediaries the models show that the financing
structure of rating agencies is affected by the market structure. Revenues shift towards
the investor-pay model in times of financial distress and increased risk awareness. The
shift is also observable empirically in the 2008-09 financial turmoil, where the increased
risk awareness is reflected in the drying-up of specific markets.3 Furthermore, the rev-
enue shares obtained in our model with honest certification match the shares observed
empirically, which thwarts the widespread argument of dishonest certification in the
recent debate.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the basic asymmetric information framework. Section 4
presents three variations of the model describing the market for credit ratings and
implications for the operation of a monopolistic rating agency on the amount of traded
products and the generated welfare. Thereafter, section 5 links the theoretical findings
with empirical observations and finally section 6 concludes. Formal proofs of the results
are provided in the appendix.
3For example, the interbanking market had to be shored up by central banks after the default of
Lehman Brothers Inc., since trust between banks on the ability to repay loans diminished. Similarly,
trades of e.g. ABS CDOs collapsed.
4Rating agencies have been blamed to be partly responsible for the financial crisis, as various
ratings had been changed substantially (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009).
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2 Related literature
Since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970), substantial attention has been devoted to
the asymmetric distribution of information between agents. Market participants can
be deterred from trade through the presence of different informational states of agents.
The literature proposes different market mechanisms to break these welfare destroying
asymmetries. In Spence (1973), agents are able to signal their private information, Klein
and Leffler (1981) allow agents to build reputation in a repeated game and Grossman
(1981) examines the effects of private information disclosure by issuing warranties by
privately informed parties.
Another line of economic research deals with the introduction of third parties, which
possess appropriate technologies to assess the quality of the goods in the market and
therewith offer their expertise in the market to reduce information asymmetries. Biglaiser
(1993) shows that such a third party, a “middleman”, improves welfare generation.5
While Biglaiser’s middlemen trade physically in the market, Lizzeri (1999) concen-
trates on the role of the third party as an information or certification intermediary.
This intermediary is not dealing the products but offers a pure certification service.
Therewith, the ex-ante private information becomes partly or fully observable by the
entire market.
The question of who demands certification services has not received much attention in
the literature. In Strausz and Stahl (2009), certificates serve as a signalling device if
the seller demands a rating and as an inspection device if the buyer uses certification
services. They examine the sales options of intermediaries in a vertically integrated
bilateral monopoly setting and find that only seller certification as a signalling de-
vice maximizes certifier’s profits. In contrast, we concentrate on the motivation for
information revelation. On the one hand, sellers demand certificates to become public
information and therewith foster competition in the product market. On the other
hand, buyers seek to exploit an informational advantage in the sales process.
5Albano and Lizzeri (2001) show that the presence of intermediaries increases the overall product
quality.
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3 The Setup
We consider a model with four players: one seller (it), two buyers (he) and one certifier
(she).6 The seller owns a single, indivisible product of quality q known to the seller
and unobservable by buyers. We assume the quality q to be uniformly distributed on
the interval [0, 1].7 The intermediary does not value the object, while the seller has a
reservation utility of αq with α ∈ [0, 1]. Parameter α characterizes the market and is
known to all players. This natural setup can be found in various markets. Banks often
choose between selling an investment product now or holding it till maturity, which
exhibits the reservation utility in our model. They compare the respective market
outcomes and decide depending on their risk preferences, their liquidity status and the
current market values.
A buyer receives the utility q out of consumption of the product, but ex ante only
knows the distribution of the product’s quality and therefore builds expectations on
the true quality level. The seller has no possibility to communicate the quality of
his product q directly and credibly to the buyers. The intermediary owns a perfect
evaluation technology, which enables her to determine the true value of q. She can
credibly communicate the product’s quality.8 If demand for an evaluation exists, by
either the seller or the buyers, the intermediary can determine the quality q at zero cost.
If the seller demands a rating, the intermediary will communicate the quality q credibly
to the market, which is thereafter known to all buyers, hence public information. If
one or both buyers demand an evaluation of the product, the intermediary discloses
the obtained information privately to the respective buyer.
The game of the model comprises 4 stages.
(1) The intermediary determines prices ps and pb for a rating sold to the seller and
to each buyer, respectively.
(2) The seller may choose to order a rating from the intermediary for the price ps.
If a rating is sold, the information about the true quality q will become public
information.
6In the remainder of the paper we use certifier, intermediary and rating agency interchangeably.
7Variations of the distribution assumptions reduce the traceability of the model.
8Sobel (1985) and Benabou and Laroque (1992) show conditions for which credibility can be
assumed.
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(3) The buyers decide simultaneously and independently whether to order a rating
for the product. Buyers, who decide to order a rating, pay price pb. The decision
to buy information is public. The acquired information on the quality q is private
information.9
(4) The product is sold in an auction between buyers.10 The reservation utility of the
seller serves as reservation price.
We assume that the intermediary is honest and applies a perfect information revelation
technology. Furthermore, we assume that she has no competitors and exploits her full
monopoly power, which is in line with recent contributions.11 In addition, we allow the
intermediary to discriminate in prices between sellers and buyers, which is plausible, as
different goods are sold to both sides of the market - on seller’s side public information
is revealed, while on buyer’s side private information is traded. The intermediary acts
as a profit-maximizing monopolist.
The utility of the seller depends on the consumption or the sale of a single product.
Depending on the highest bid in the auction, the seller either sells the product or
consumes it at the given reservation utility αq. Since the seller initially decides whether
to produce or sell a product, we assume it to be the first which decides whether to order
a rating or not.12
The buyers bid for the product in a first-price sealed-bid auction, with an a priori
unknown reservation price, namely the reservation utility of the seller.13 The first price
auction is a natural way to model the selling stage. Initial public offerings in financial
markets or sales on stock markets feature a similar structure. We assume that in the
first-price auction buyers are aware of the opponent’s information holdings.14
9The certifier cannot commit to sell exclusively to one buyer.
10As buyers valuation is identical a common value auction applies.
11Strausz (2005) motivates the high concentration and earnings in the industry.
12Simultaneous decisions by buyers and sellers do not alter the general outcomes. The chosen timing
reflects the rather realistic situation that the producer of a product initially is able to decide whether
selling it in an auction format with certification or without.
13For further types of common value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, the academic
research is quite silent about picking the “right” equilibrium. We therefore follow the findings by
Wilson (1967), Weverbergh (1979), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Rob (1985), Hendricks et al. (1994);
Kagel and Levin (1999), Campbell and Levin (2000) and Kim (2008). Second-price common value
auctions feature multiple equilibria. Sequential bargaining with a Stackelberg leader yields similar
results. For modelling the first price auction we refer to recent findings by e.g. Larson (2009).
14Relaxing this assumption does not fundamentally alter the solution, but reduces the value of
private information in the game and diminishes the profit of the privately informed party.
6
By applying a market parameter α we partly embed a basic adverse selection frame-
work.15 The market parameter α determines the difference in valuation (1−α)q between
buyers and sellers, which generates the possible gains from trade. Ex ante expected
welfare Wmax generated by one particular trade yields:
Wmax =
1∫
0
(1− α)qdq = 1− α
2
.
As we primarily focus on the market outcomes and the welfare implications, we take
an ex-ante viewpoint and study different quality levels of the seller. This is equivalent
to a model where each seller of the quality interval [0, 1] faces two buyers once, with
Wmax being the maximum realizable welfare.
4 Optimal behavior of a monopolistic certifier
The following section contains the results for different selling strategies. After ana-
lyzing the market without a certifier, we investigate certification solely on one side of
the market, either on the seller side or the buyer side. Thereafter, we examine the
optimal strategies of two-sided certification. To end this section we give some intuition
complementary to the calculations which clarifies the economic findings of the model.
4.1 The market without the certifier
It is known since Akerlof (1970) that in specific markets trade may collapse due to
asymmetrically distributed information. Sellers cannot be differentiated according to
their quality level and buyers are only willing to pay a uniform price reflecting the
average quality in the market. Facing the relatively low average price, high-quality
sellers do not accept the price, and consequently leave the market. This affects the
buyers’ beliefs on the average quality offered by the remaining sellers. This dynamic
may lead to the collapse of the entire market.
In a market with α > 1
2
the only equilibrium with rational expectations about quality is
15For high values of α the problem of asymmetric information becomes exuberant in the setup as
markets may collapse.
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the pair of bidding strategies (0, 0) and no product with positive quality being sold. In
the remainder of the paper we will refer to this market setting as the ’Lemon Market’.
With a deviating bid of b a buyer wins the auction if the bid exceeds the reservation
utility of the seller. The expected quality of such a product is E[q|αq ≤ b]. As q is
uniformly distributed the expected quality is qe = b
2α
. The parameter α is greater than
1
2
and thus qe < b holds. Consequently, a deviation does not pay off and the equilibrium
bids are unique, and the market collapses.16
Figure 1: Market outcomes without a certifier
Market solution (possible)
Market collapses as high-quality firms
leave the market
,qD
Willingness
to pay
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to pay
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2
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2
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2
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Contrarily, in the market with α ≤ 1
2
the equilibrium bidding strategy for each buyer
is to bid his own valuation for a product of unknown quality which is qe = 1
2
. In
the remainder of the paper we refer to this market setting as the ’Honey Market’.17
Every seller accepts a bid b = 1
2
as 1
2
≥ αq for all q ∈ [0, 1]. All products are traded
and the maximum welfare is realized. The complete gains from trade are earned by
the sellers, as buyers bid in expectations and compete in prices for the product, and
ultimately realize no profits. Proposition 1 states the results for both markets without
certification.
Proposition 1 (a) In the Lemon Market (α > 1
2
) no trades occur without certification.
16The applied auction format mirrors exactly the well known asymmetric information dynamics of
the Akerlof model (Akerlof, 1970), since the reservation price is unknown.
17Contrary to lemons, which rot from the inside, honey is one of the most durable natural products.
8
(b) In the Honey Market all goods are traded for price qe = E{q} = 1
2
and the entire
welfare of Wmax =
1−α
2
is exploited without certification.
4.2 One-sided certification
The information asymmetries might be overcome by an intermediary, who credibly
provides the quality level of the seller for the buyers. Thereby, it is important to
distinguish the different roles of information provision when selling the service to the
buyers or the seller. On the one hand, the intermediary might announce the rating
result publicly. Therewith, the intermediary maximizes the amount of potential buyers
for the product. This is desirable for the seller, as revelation of public information
results in a Bertrand-like pricing competition on buyer-side which in turn increases the
seller’s profit. On the other hand, the information might be privately owned by one or
both potential buyers. In this case, the intermediary reveals relevant information solely
privately. This allows the informed buyer to use the informal advantage in the selling
process. As a result, buyers are willing to pay for the certification service to generate
an extra profit. The intermediary therefore limits the distribution of information in
order to maximize her own profits. The seller faces a limited number of buyers. The
bargaining power potentially shifts partly to the buyers. In our model, the intermediary
cannot credibly commit to sell the certification solely to one of the buyers, as she has
an incentive to deviate in accepting an offer from the second buyer. The following
section discusses alternatives and equilibrium outcomes of the model with one-sided
certification.
4.2.1 One-sided seller-certification
To study the alternative channels, assume first that an intermediary offers her service
exclusively to the seller for a profit maximizing price ps. To solve the model, we
determine the perfect bayesian equilibrium. In the last stage of the game the buyers are
symmetrically informed: either both are informed about the quality of the product, or
both are uninformed and can solely build quality expectations. Each price ps at which
there is demand for certification induces a quality threshold. The threshold emerges as
the seller’s profit from certification is increasing in quality in both markets, the Lemon
and the Honey Market. Hence, all sellers with a quality above a certain level q¯ ∈ [0, 1]
9
order a rating and make a profit. Figure 2 shows the continuum of quality levels and
the interval on which sellers order a rating.
Figure 2: Quality threshold q¯
no rating rating
q
q
10
The seller assures that the product is traded for the price q, if it ordered a rating and
the information on the quality is publicly announced, since buyers share a common
valuation for the product and therefore compete in prices. The critical quality level q¯ is
determined by the seller, who is indifferent between receiving q¯ and paying ps or either
being traded for the expected quality in the Honey Market or consuming its reservation
utility in the Lemon Market. All uncertified products exhibit quality in the interval
[0, q¯]. Buyers build beliefs on the quality which we denote by qe in the Honey Market,
whereas the Lemon Market collapses. Low quality sellers are still able to pool with
superior quality sellers up to q¯, since buyers are unable to distinguish between sellers,
as the remaining quality is unknown.
If no rating is demanded by the seller, buyers will remain uninformed about the true
quality of the product, and will not bid in the Lemon Market; in the Honey Market they
will bid their expected valuation qe. For this case, the same intuition holds as without
certification. If the seller demands a rating, the only equilibrium in the first price sealed-
bid common value auction is to bid the own valuation, which is the publicly announced
true quality q. The following Lemma 1 illustrates the buyers’ bidding behavior.
Lemma 1 (a) In the Lemon Market uninformed buyers bid 0 and informed buyers bid
their valuation q. (b) In the Honey Market uninformed buyers bid qe and informed
buyers bid q.
The seller has to value its different options in the specific markets. It might either
order a rating for a given price ps in order to receive the price for the true valuation, or
10
it faces the outcome for non-rated sellers in the respective market without paying the
certification fee. In turn the seller either sells the product for the expected average price
in the Honey Market or sustains from selling in the Lemon Market. Therefore, the profit
maximizing price of the certifier enables those sellers with the highest quality products
to generate an extra rent by ordering a rating. The following Lemma 2 illustrates the
induced quality threshold that depends on the certification price.
Lemma 2 (a) In the Lemon Market, a seller orders a rating for certification price ps
iff q > q¯(ps) =
ps
1−α . (b) In the Honey Market, the seller orders a rating for certification
price ps iff q > q¯(ps) = 2ps.
The certifier maximizes her revenues ΠC(ps) = ps(1−q¯(ps)) by either selling to few high-
quality sellers or by increasing the number of certificates and simultaneously lowering
the respective price ps. Higher certification prices induce higher q¯. A high market
parameter α will c.p. increase the threshold value q¯ in the Lemon Market, since a
higher reservation value decreases the potential gains from trade.
Proposition 2 states the intermediary’s optimal pricing strategy and the equilibrium
results for the relevant market measures; ΠS denotes the expected seller’s profits, ΠC
denotes the expected certifier’s profits and W is the realized welfare in the respective
market.
Proposition 2 (a) In the Lemon Market with one-sided seller-certification the profit
maximizing price for the certifier is ps =
1−α
2
. A seller with quality q ≥ q¯ = 1
2
orders a
rating. The certifier’s profit is ΠC =
1−α
4
and the seller’s profit sums up to ΠS =
1−α
8
.
Buyers do not make any profits and overall welfare is W = 3
8
(1− α).
(b) In the Honey Market with one-sided seller-certification the profit maximizing price
for the certifier is ps =
1
4
. A seller with quality q ≥ q¯ = 1
2
orders a rating. The profit of
the certifier is ΠC =
1
8
. The seller’s profit sums up to ΠS = Wmax − 18 . Buyers do not
make any profits and the entire possible welfare W = Wmax is realized.
A seller with quality above 1
2
orders a rating in both markets, the Lemon and the Honey
Market, and pays a price of 1
4
in the Honey Market and a smaller price of 1−α
2
in the
Lemon Market. Compared to the profits in the market without certification, sellers
gain in the Lemon Market, since the intermediary enables them to trade their products
and increases their rents from zero to 1−α
4
. In contrast, the overall gains of all sellers
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in the Honey Market are reduced by 1
8
, because the intermediary receives parts of their
potential gains from trade. As a result, the introduction of an intermediary increases
welfare in the Lemon Market and does not affect welfare in the Honey Market.
Remarkably, the certification price and the certifier’s profit do not depend on market
parameter α in the Honey Market. This may seem astonishing at first glance, as poten-
tial gains from trade differ significantly between varying market settings, characterized
by the market parameter α. Since all products are traded even without a certifier,
the seller’s reservation utility does not enter the equilibrium result18 by construction.
Hence, the certifier cannot gain from variations in α, and the profit of the certifier is
capped to 1
8
.
4.2.2 One-sided buyer-certification
In contrast to offering of the certification service exclusively to the seller, the interme-
diary might opt to serve solely the other side of the market, namely the buyers, by
selling her rating service for the price pb. The objective for information revelation is
fundamentally different: in the case of seller-certification publicly announced ratings
are required to differentiate the product from the remainder in the market. In contrast,
a buyer can only realize information rents if he exclusively possesses the information.
Both buyers decide simultaneously whether to order a rating and build expectations on
the likelihood of being the only consumer of the certification service.
In pure strategies, no symmetric equilibrium exists: if both buyers order a rating, they
will accrue losses and a deviation will pay off; if neither of the two buyers order a
rating, it will pay off to order a rating as the deviating buyer ends up being exclusively
informed. Thus, the only symmetric equilibrium is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which each buyer decides with a certain probability ω to order a rating. Since buyers
are indifferent to ordering a rating, the expected profit is zero. By assumption, buyers
are aware of the distribution of the information in the market at the beginning of the
first-price auction.
If both buyers are informed, buyers will bid their own valuation q, since they enter into a
price competition as in the case of seller-certification. This result holds in both markets.
For the remaining information structures, results differ between market structures. In
18Bidding strategies are always independent of the underlying market parameter α.
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the Lemon Market, the unique equilibrium with two uninformed buyers is to bid zero,
since the asymmetric information feature prevails as it does without certification. If one
of the buyers is exclusively informed, the bidding strategy is b = αq and the uninformed
bids zero. Thereby, the informed buyer extracts the entire information rent, as the seller
is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer. The uninformed buyer cannot
gain in the auction by making a positive bid, since the expected quality of the product
is lower than his bid if he beats the bid of the informed buyer. In the Honey Market the
results differ significantly. If both buyers do not order a certificate for the given price pb,
the buyers will bid their expected valuation qe = 1
2
. In the case of only one exclusively
informed buyer, his equilibrium bidding strategy is to bid b = 1
2
q. The uninformed buyer
mixes on the interval [0, 1
2
] according to distribution function F (b) = 2b and generates
an expected profit of zero. This is the unique equilibrium in a first-price auction with
asymmetrically informed bidders as shown by Weverbergh (1979). Lemma 3 states the
buyers’ bidding behavior.
Lemma 3 Buyers’ bidding behavior depending on the information structure and the
type of the underlying market is given by the bidding functions in Table 1.
Table 1: Bidding behavior of buyers with seller-certification
informed uninformed
informed (q, q)
(αq, 0) if α > 1
2
(1
2
q, F (b)) if α ≤ 1
2
uninformed
(0, αq) if α > 1
2
(F (b), 1
2
q) if α ≤ 1
2
(0, 0) if α > 1
2
(qe, qe) if α ≤ 1
2
The distribution function of bids for a single uniformed buyer is F (b) = 2b.
Lemma 3 shows that the advantage of being exclusively informed differs fundamentally
between the Lemon and the Honey Market: In the Lemon Market an informational
advantage leads to winning the auction with probability 1. Hereby,the entire gains from
trade V Lib are realized. In contrast, being exclusively informed in the Honey Market leads
to some positive expected payoff V Hib in the upcoming auction with a lower probability,
as shown in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 (a) In the Lemon Market the expected payoff of a single informed bidder
is V Lib =
1−α
2
. (b) In the Honey Market the expected payoff of an exclusively informed
bidder is V Hib =
1
6
.
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Lemma 4 shows that the expected payoff is always positive and that buyers always
favor the alternative of being exclusively informed. The jump at the border of α = 1
2
in the two markets reflects the substantially diverging equilibria of the auction formats
and the attached potential gains. In general, a buyer follows a strategy to obtain an
informational advantage to maximize the expected profit. As the buyers randomize
over the decision to order a rating using symmetric mixed strategies, their expected
overall profit is zero; the buyers gamble for profits.
As Lemma 4 exhibits the expected payoffs net of the price pb for the private rating, each
price pb for the certification service induces a different probability of ordering a rating.
As buyers play a mixed strategy in the information acquisition game, the probability
ω is determined by the indifference condition of receiving the corresponding payoffs in
the respective markets V ·ib with probability 1− ω at the price pb or having an expected
payoff of zero. The induced rating probabilities are shown in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 (a) In the Lemon Market a buyer orders a rating at a given price pb with a
probability ω(pb) = max{0, 1− 2pb1−α}. (b) In the Honey Market a buyer orders a rating
at a given price pb with a probability ω(pb) = max{0, 1− 6pb}.
Lemma 5 shows that higher rating prices induce lower probabilities ω to order a rating
by buyers. The certifier maximizes her profits ΠC(pb) = (ω(pb))
22pb + 2ω(pb)(1 −
ω(pb))pb by either attracting few buyers with a high price and low rating demand or
decreasing the price to increase the likelihood ω that a buyer demands a rating. From
the perspective of the intermediary the most profitable case is to sell her service to both
investors, since she can extract a double dividend 2pb, as both buyers might pay the
price pb for the certificate.
Intuitively, with a price higher than V Lib respectively V
H
ib the demand diminishes to zero,
as the expected payoff of being exclusively informed is lower than the rating price pb.
The intermediary will therefore choose a price which is lower. Proposition 3 exhibits
the perfect bayesian equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 3 (a) In the Lemon Market with one-sided buyer-certification the profit
maximizing price for the certifier is pb =
1−α
4
. The probability that a buyer orders a
rating is ω = 1
2
. The profit for the certifier is ΠC =
1−α
4
and the seller’s profit is
ΠS =
1−α
8
. Buyers do not make any profits and overall welfare is W = 3
8
(1− α).
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(b) In the Honey Market with one-sided buyer-certification the profit maximizing price
for the certifier is pb =
1
12
. The probability that a buyer orders a rating is ω = 1
2
. The
profit for the certifier is ΠC =
1
12
and the seller’s profit is ΠS = Wmax − 112 . Buyers do
not make any profits and the entire possible welfare W = Wmax is realized.
In expectation a buyer will not make any profits, even though he generates profits out
of an information advantage. The generated rent diminishes to zero in equilibrium,
since buyers accrue losses when both order a rating, which offsets the gains of exclusive
information. The likelihood of ordering a rating by the buyers is substantial. They
seek to maximize their profits by bidding informed in half of the cases. As a result, one
exclusively informed bidder evolves in 50 percent of the cases, while respectively in 25
percent investors are either equally informed or uninformed.
Similarly, to the intuition in the case of one-sided seller-certification, the rating price
and the profit of the certifier do not depend on the market structure in the Honey
Market. The certifier cannot exploit the additional gains from trade in a market with
a low market parameter α. The bidding behavior is independent from the reservation
price of the seller in the auction, as the market also clears without a certification service.
The jump in the sellers profit function at α = 1
2
finally reflects the strict distinction in
the participation behavior of uninformed buyers in the auction of the product. This is
mainly due to the fact that uninformed buyers in the Honey Market are also willing to
buy the product, while they refrain from bidding in the Lemon Market.
4.3 Comparison of one-sided certification
Comparing the results of the two types of one-sided certification reveals the differences
between the information provisions by the certifier. Firstly, the evaluated products in
both models differ. With seller-certification, the best half of the products is traded
and with buyer-certification it is a random draw from all products that are evaluated
and thereafter sold, since the products cannot be differentiated ex-ante. The traded
products differ in both market settings, the Lemon and the Honey Market.
In every market, demand for certification service exists and the intermediary realizes
profits by offering the information revelation service. Even in the market where trades
occur without a certification service, the players demand a rating to maximize their
profits and overall loose parts of their profits in total. The intermediary’s profit is
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higher in the Honey Market than in the Lemon Market. Even though the intermediary
enables trades in the Lemon Market and therefore contributes to welfare generation,
the overall rents are higher in the Honey Market and in turn the intermediary also
extracts a higher absolute value of the rents at stake. The profit shares are smaller
in the Honey Market, since the information asymmetries are overcome by the market
itself even without an intermediary and thus the market power of the intermediary is
smaller.
In the Honey Market, the certifier prefers to sell the service to the seller-side, since
the information value for privately informed buyers is too low, and thus the certifier
generates lower revenues. The uninformed buyer bids randomly in the Honey Market,
which reduces the information advantage, whereas he withstands bidding in the Lemon
Market. In a Lemon Market the certifier is indifferent on which side to offer her service.
The intuition for this result is that in both cases the certifier sells the whole bargaining
power; in the case of public information the seller can sell his product at the maximum
price of q and in the case of a private information advantage the respective buyer can
buy the product for the minimum price of αq.19 The sellers’ profits are equal in the
Lemon Market under both regimes, but are lower in the Honey Market with seller-sided
certification, since the preferences of certifier and seller are reversed in the discussed
cases.
All potential gains from trade are realized in the Honey Market, but the intermediary
increases exploited welfare in the Lemon Market to 75 percent of potential welfare.
Figure 3 shows the realized potential welfare for all market parameters as well as for the
different players. Remarkably, not all potential rents are realized in the Lemon Market.
25 percent are lost even with the presence of an intermediary.20
Corollary 6 states the main results of the previous section on one-sided certification.
Corollary 6 (a) In the Lemon Market buyers, seller and the certifier are indifferent to
one-sided buyer- and seller-certification. The welfare gains are positive and equal under
both regimes compared to no gains from trade without certification.
(b) In the Honey Market the certifier prefers to offer her service to the seller side, while
the seller prefers (ex ante) the certifier to operate on the buyer side. Welfare is not
19The certifier is able to correct for potential losses on buyer-side through double-certification by a
lower certification price.
20Note that the potential welfare varies significantly with the market parameter, as Wmax =
1−α
2 .
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Figure 3: Profit shares with one-sided seller-certification
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4.4 Two-sided certification
The model of two-sided certification combines the previous models of one-sided certifi-
cation. The certifier maximizes profits by selling the certification service either to the
seller or to the buyers. She can discriminate in prices by offering public and private
ratings. The seller either orders a rating directly and therewith differentiates its quality
directly from the remaining sellers in the market and induces buyer-sided competition
in prices, or remains unrated. Buyers seek to be exclusively informed by ordering pri-
vate ratings to gain some informational advantage. We show that the certifier profits
from the fact, that she can sequentially segment the market by discriminatory pricing
for public and private information disclosure.
Beginning with the analysis of the game described, one sees that the structure of the
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equilibrium outcome of the game is as follows: In equilibrium the continuum of sellers
is divided into two segments: one containing the high quality sellers, q ∈ [q¯II , 1], where
sellers order a rating and trade products for the price of the true quality q. A second
segment contains the lower-quality sellers q ∈ [0, q¯II ], which do not order a rating. In
this interval the higher quality part of the sellers speculate that both buyers order a
rating, or trades occur without a certificate. The seller’s decision depends on the quality
of his own product and on the (endogenous) prices of the certification service ps and pb
set by the intermediary.21
Figure 4: Difference of seller segmentation with one- and two-sided certification.
norating rating
q
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Figure 4 illustrates the segmentation of sellers with different quality levels. A shift
of the quality threshold level between one-sided seller-certification (q¯) and two-sided
certification (q¯II) evolves.
In the following we solve the game for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The optimal
bidding behavior depends on the quality threshold q¯II , which is known in equilibrium,
and the information structure of the buyers. If both buyers are informed about the
quality q the unique bidding equilibrium is (q, q), which holds in both markets, and
exhibits the price competition of buyers for the product. With one exclusively informed
buyer, the market structure impacts the equilibrium outcomes: In the Lemon Market
the informed buyer bids αq and the uninformed one does not bid at all. In the Honey
Market with only one exclusively informed buyer, his equilibrium bidding strategy is to
bid b = 1
2
q. The uninformed mixes on the interval [0, 1
2
q¯II ] according to the distribution
function Fq¯II (b) =
2
q¯II
b and generates an expected profit of zero. With two uninformed
buyers the market collapses in the Lemon Market. In the Honey Market, the buyers bid
the expected quality of an uncertified product, which we denote by qe. Buyers thereby
enter a price competition and realize no profit.
21This basic intuition for the equilibrium structure does not exclude corner solutions, i.e. ω = 0 or
qII = 1.
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Compared to the bidding behavior in the one-sided buyer-certification model the only
differences emerge from (1) the equivalence of one seller-sided rating and two buyer-
sided ratings and (2) the threshold q¯II , which determines the potential quality levels
of not publicly certified products. The possible bidding equilibria for the different
information structures of both buyers are illustrated in Lemma 7.
Table 2: Bidding behavior for the case of two-sided certification
informed uninformed
informed (q, q)
(αq, 0) if α > 1
2
(1
2
q, Fq¯II (b)) if α ≤ 12
uninformed
(0, αq) if α > 1
2
(Fq¯II (b),
1
2
q) if α ≤ 1
2
(0, 0) if α > 1
2
(qe, qe) if α ≤ 1
2
The distribution function of bids for a single uniformed buyer is Fq¯II (b) =
2
q¯II
b.
Lemma 7 Buyer’s bidding behavior depending on the information structure, the quality
threshold and the type of the underlying market is given by the bidding functions in
Table 2.
Similar to the case of one-sided buyer-certification, Lemma 7 shows that the advantage
of being exclusively informed differs fundamentally between the Lemon Market and the
Honey Market.
In the Lemon Market an informational advantage leads to winning the auction with
probability 1. Thereby the entire gains from trade V Lib are realized. Whereas being
exclusively informed in the Honey Market only leads to some positive expected payoff
V Hib in the upcoming auction with a certain probability smaller than 1, as the uninformed
bidder still bids in the auction.
Lemma 8 (a) In the Lemon Market the expected payoff of a single informed bidder
is V Lib (ps, pb) = (1 − α) q¯II(pb,ps)2 . (b) In the Honey Market the expected payoff of an
exclusively informed bidder is V Hib (ps, pb) =
1
6
q¯II(pb, ps).
Lemma 8 illustrates the expected payoffs of a buyer given he is exclusively informed.
The values reflect the information value for the buyer. In the Honey Market, the
information value does not depend on the market parameter α, indicating that the value
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of information is capped, as trades would also occur without certification services. As
in the case of one-sided buyer-certification, a jump in the payoff function V ·ib at α =
1
2
exists and indicates the different probabilities of winning the auction in the two markets
with one informed buyer.
Depending on the certification price pb and the induced threshold q¯II the buyers them-
selves choose the equilibrium rate of ordering private information on a product’s quality.
Obviously, they never order a rating if the seller already publicly revealed the infor-
mation. As again a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails, buyers have to be indifferent
between ordering a rating by paying pb and receiving the corresponding V
·
ib with a cer-
tain probability or having an expected payoff of zero. Lemma 9 states the individual
rating probabilities in equilibrium.
Lemma 9 (a) In the Lemon Market a buyer orders a rating at given prices (ps, pb) with
a probability ω(ps, pb) = max{0, 1 − 2pb(1−α)q¯II(ps,pb)}. (b) In the Honey Market a buyer
orders a rating at given prices (ps, pb) with a probability ω(ps, pb) = max{0, 1− 6pbq¯II(ps,pb)}.
Intuitively, the probability of buyers ordering a rating diminishes in pb, as the certifi-
cation service is a normal good. With increasing threshold values q¯II , the probability
increases, as the potential gains at stake increase. Comparing Lemma 8 and Lemma 9
states that ω decreases to zero as the price of the certification service pb approaches the
corresponding V ·ib.
At the second stage of the game, the sellers decide whether they require the certifier to
publicly reveal the quality of their product q or to stay pooled with other uncertified
products.22 The intuition for the consideration of the seller with a product of a given
quality is as follows. In both markets a high-quality seller tries to publicly disclose its
true quality to both buyers by ordering a rating to avoid being pooled with the uncer-
tified remainder of the market. A mid-quality seller hopes to be rated by both buyers
to avoid being pooled with low-quality sellers, which leads to the same information
structure as if the product’s quality is disclosed publicly, while the certification costs
ps are shifted towards the buyers. Depending on the market structure, a low-quality
22The timing of our setup does not influence the results. Simultaneous decisions of the seller and
the buyers whether or not to order a rating lead to the same equilibrium profits and welfare. In this
setting, high-quality sellers will also opt to order a rating and thus a quality threshold q¯II evolves,
which equals the threshold in the standard setting, since no information rent can be extracted from a
product with a public rating.
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seller does not hope to be rated by buyers in the Honey Market, as it then realizes
the expected price of the remaining pooled products, whereas it favours to be rated in
markets where its product is otherwise not traded at all (Lemon Market). Hence, the
quality threshold q¯II not only depends on the price for seller certification, but also on
the price for buyer certification, as the seller might expect to be rated by the buyers.
The threshold value is determined by the seller who is indifferent between requesting a
rating and revealing its quality or refraining from ordering. In the latter case it hopes to
be rated by at least one buyer, as the indifferent seller is pooled with products of lower
quality. Lemma 10 states the induced quality thresholds, depending on the certification
prices set by the intermediary.
Lemma 10 (a) In the Lemon Market, a seller orders a rating for certification prices
(ps, pb) iff q > q¯II(ps, pb) =
4p2s
(4pb−ps)(1−α)
. (b) In the Honey Market, a seller orders a
rating for certification prices (ps, pb) iff q > q¯II(ps, pb) =
18p2
b
6pb−ps
.
Both, the seller’s and buyer’s decision to order a rating depend on the rating price
set by the certifier. With increasing certification prices, the amount of ratings for the
respective side decreases. Hence, the certifier sets revenue-maximizing prices for her
service that allow her to skim the rents in the market. She faces a trade-off by increasing
the price of seller-certification ps, which leads to a loss of demand by the seller, while
the remaining market becomes more attractive for the buyers, as some higher quality
products allow for higher potential information rents, and therewith c.p. the revenues
from buyers increase. Accordingly, the certifier maximizes her profit by inducing the
optimal combination of a threshold q¯II and a buyer-sided certification in the remaining
market. Proposition 4 captures the optimal pricing strategy for the certifier and the
equilibrium outcomes of the two-sided certification model.
Proposition 4 (a) In the Lemon Market with two-sided certification, the profit max-
imizing price for seller-certificaton is ps =
16
27
(1 − α) and pb = 29(1 − α) for buyer-
certification. The probability that a buyer will order a rating is ω = 1
3
and the quality
threshold value is q¯II =
2
3
. The profit for the certifier is ΠC =
8
27
(1 − α) and the
seller’s profit is ΠS = (1 − α) 17162 . Buyers do not make any profits and overall welfare
is W = (1− α) 65
162
6= Wmax.
(b) In the Honey Market with two-sided certification the profit maximizing price for
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seller-certification is ps =
3(3−
√
5)
2(2+
√
5)
and pb =
√
5−1
4(2+
√
5)
for buyer-certification. The prob-
ability that a buyer will order a rating is ω = 1
2+
√
5
and the quality threshold value is
q¯II =
3
4
(3 − √5). The profit for the certifier is ΠC = 9−3
√
5
8+4
√
5
and the seller’s profit
is ΠS =
1−α
2
− ΠC. Buyers do not make any profits and the entire possible welfare
W = Wmax is realized.
In equilibrium, one third of the sellers order a rating compared to one half in the case
of one-sided certification. In either case, the best part of the sellers order a rating
and a threshold value q¯II and q¯, respectively, evolve. Interestingly, sellers with quality
q ∈ [1
2
, 2
3
] choose to order a rating if there is solely one-sided seller-certification, but
refrain from ordering, if the option of being subsequently rated by the buyers exist.23
Two main reasons for the findings prevail. On the one hand, the intermediary slightly
increases the seller price of the rating with two-sided certification and thereby reduces
the demand. On the other hand, the seller gambles to be rated by both buyers. Hereby,
it avoids paying the certification price and increases its own profits. However, the
expected seller’s profit is lower with two-sided certification than in the other models,
while the profit of the certifier increases. Buyers do not make any profits in equilibrium.
The profit variations hold in both markets.
The rating probability of the buyers decreases with two-sided certification compared to
one-sided certification, since the available information rents are smaller, because high-
quality sellers already left the market by publicly revealing their quality. Furthermore,
Proposition 4 shows that the prices for buyers with two-sided certification remain fairly
stable in both markets compared to the model of one-sided buyer-certification. Hence,
buyers adjust their behavior by lowering the rating probability.
The effects on the overall welfare depend on the market structure. In the Lemon Market,
a certification service increases welfare substantially. It rises from 3
8
(1−α) to 65
162
(1−α),
as the number of ratings increases and subsequently so do the number of trades in the
market. In contrast, welfare is not affected in the Honey Market, as even without a
certifier, no inefficiencies occur. The market is always cleared. The welfare gains are
even higher in the case of two-sided certification as opposed to one-sided certification.
Therefore, one might conclude that two-sided certification should be promoted to allow
23Given the optimal seller-certification price ps of two-sided certification in the Lemon Market, and
assuming no buyer certification the quality threshold is q¯ = 1627 <
2
3 = q¯II . In the Honey Market, the
threshold increases from q¯ = 3(3−
√
5)
2+
√
5
< 34 (3−
√
5) = q¯II . The shift is shown in Figure 4.
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for an efficient allocation of resources, if the value of information asymmetries is high.
The general intuition for the result is as follows. The certifier’s strategic decision to sell
on both sides of the market has two opposite effects. On the one hand she becomes her
own competitor, which weakens her position compared to operating only on one specific
side of the market. On the other hand she is able to exploit some rents on both sides
by taking advantage of the special conditions on each side. Seller- and buyer-side differ
fundamentally in the sense that in a seller market high-quality sellers order a rating and
in a buyer market rated products are randomly selected by speculative buyers. Hence,
profits are generated in the high segment in the former market and are generated
randomly in the latter. By combining these two market features to maximize profits,
the certifier has to determine the optimal threshold of sellers self-selecting to order
public ratings. The market for buyer ratings becomes more attractive with one-sided
seller-ratings if less ratings become public. The positive effect of having a bigger market
for unrated products outweighs the negative effect of becoming her own competitor.
From the perspective of one-sided buyer-certification, the introduction of seller-certification
reduces the attractiveness for buyers to order a rating, as the high-quality segment has
already been separated from the poor-quality products at an earlier stage. This neg-
ative effect is outweighed by the rents the certifier can exploit from the high-quality
sellers, which are willing to pay a relatively high price for this separation.
5 Application to the Rating Market
This section links the theoretical results with empirical observations in the rating in-
dustry and discusses the findings. The increasing complexity of financial markets in
the last decades caused a massive increase in the reliance on credit ratings by investors,
issuers and regulatory bodies. Issuers, such as firms or sovereign entities, share mainly
two incentives to demand ratings: they expect to receive a lower premium on their
financial instruments and to face a broader investment pool, which in turn reduces the
liquidity premia in the market. Institutional investors, such as insurers, reinsurers and
pension funds might require ratings of financial products before assets can be entered
into their portfolios. Many of these investors follow long-term strategies and apply port-
folio governance rules, consisting of buy and sell restrictions linked to rating changes, to
manage their portfolios (Lo¨ffler, 2004). Therefore, retaining a strong investment rating
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in some or even all of their asset classes is essential. Private investors also rely on pub-
licly available ratings to optimize their portfolios and to reduce the costs of information
acquisition.
The market for rating agencies is highly concentrated and is estimated to generate
annual revenues of about $4.5 billions. The two biggest rating agencies, Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s, share 80 percent of the market and together with the number
three, Fitch Ratings, the market share becomes 95 percent. The operating margins of
the leading rating agencies are close to 50 percent and have been relatively stable over
the last years, even in the current turmoil of financial markets.
Several arguments for the high concentration24 and the high profit margins in the rating
industry were stressed in the recent debate:
1. a rigorous accreditation procedure by the national regulators,
2. perpetuation of honest ratings through reputation and the high costs of deviating
from reliable ratings,
3. portfolio rules that directly link the investment decision to ratings by specific
rating agencies,
4. and the reliance on third party ratings within various regulatory processes.
A rigorous accreditation procedure of rating agencies by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the US can only partly explain the highly impeding competition in the
market, since currently 10 Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations exist.
In addition, in other regions of the world a high concentration can also be observed,
e.g. in Japan two players share most of the market, namely the Japan Credit Rating
Agency as well as the Rating and Investment Information Inc..
Strausz (2005) underlines the importance of high profits to avoid bribing in the indus-
try. A rating agency compares the discounted cash-flow of honest certification with
a deviation strategy that includes profits from bribing. With decreasing profits from
honest certification, the likelihood of incorrect ratings increases, which in turn decreases
welfare.
24Natural and synthetic entry barriers might be the reason.
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Various institutional investors limit their management in their portfolio choice. They
rely on ratings to limit the risk exposure and the potential losses by specific financial
products. Often, they require investments to be rated above a minimum threshold
value. In addition, they require multiple ratings to avoid rating shopping by firms
(Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). As a consequence, contract clauses manifest the position
of incumbents, deter entries in the rating market and establish major entry barriers.
National regulators also heavily rely on credit ratings of the major rating agencies and
often request not only one rating, but up to three ratings in the regulatory process
(Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009). According to the Basel II accords, minimum capital
requirements for banks are computed using different weights for specific rating groups
(BIS, 2004) in order to assess the risk exposure of bank portfolios. Furthermore, the
collateral, which is required to obtain central bank liquidity, has to meet minimum rat-
ing requirements. Hence, we model the certification intermediary to be a monopolistic
supplier, which is free to set profit maximizing prices for her certification services.
In our model the certifier possesses a perfect evaluation technology. Following the
tremendous shock after the default of Lehman Brothers Inc. in September 2008, rating
agencies were blamed for their inaccurate ratings. Since then, various rating changes
were initiated. However, the market evaluated the risks similar to rating agencies, and
thus they can hardly be blamed ex post for modeling the financial interlinkages and
potential contagion or spillover effects inadequately.
The business model with respect to the sales model of certification services has changed
significantly over time. Before 1970, ratings were primarily sold to investors, who
subscribed to attain certification information, which were thereafter private information
of subscribers. We investigate this sales scheme in Section 4.2.2. After 1970, the rating
agencies decided to additionally sell their services to the other side of the market, to
firms or issuers. We investigate this in Section 4.4. After the firm receives a rating, the
information is immediately public and can be observed by all market participants. This
sales model, certification services and consultancy both offered at the same time, raised
the question of potential conflicts of interest. Firms, especially banks, might succumb
to bribing in an issuer-pay model. The failure of rating agencies in the current financial
crisis is said to be a consequence of their intertwined relationships.25 This argument is
insufficient to explanation the recent rating failures, since long-term rating evaluations
25Review e.g. Sy (2009) for a detailed argumentation.
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concluded that they were rather accurate (Reinhart et al., 2002) and are not susceptible
to bribing in the current setting.26
Exemplarily Table 3 illustrates Moody’s revenue shares, generated by selling rating ser-
vices to investors and issuers, respectively. The pattern shows a relatively high revenue
share of the issuer-pay model, which decreased with the extent of the worldwide finan-
cial crisis. The efficiency of markets was reduced tremendously during the financial tur-
moil and at the same time, issuer-generated revenues declined, while investor-generated
revenues hiked (Table 3). Some markets broke down completely and no trades were
completed.27 Various financial institutions had to adjust their market-to-market book
values, which led to a downward spiral and even higher downward pressure on prices.
Thereby, two reasons prevailed: on the one hand, the degree of asymmetric information
in some markets increased. On the other hand, the expected risks of products perceived
by sellers and buyers increased.
In our model, the seller contributes to two-thirds of the certifiers’ revenues in the lemon
market, while the buyers contribute the remaining third. In the Honey Market the
seller contributes 86 percent while the buyers contributes only 14 percent. Hence, the
issuer’s profit shares are lower in the lemon market. As a result, our findings of the
model are in line with recent observations of the financing of rating agencies (Table 3).
Table 3: Moody’s yearly revenues and revenue shares depending on sales scheme
in millions US$ 2008 2007 2006
Moody’s Analytics (mainly investor-pay model) 550.7 479.1 397.3
Moody’s Investors Service (mainly issuer-pay model) 1,268.3 1,835.4 1,685.6
Total revenues 1,755.4 2,259.0 2,037
Issuer-pay revenue share 72.3% 81.2% 82.7%
Source: (Moody’s, 2008, p.94).
Notes: Consolidated revenues of business segments in the respective years in millions US$.
Further market patterns observed in the current financial crisis are also considered in
our model. Increasing volatility in the markets and higher risks of product valuation
for both parties are reflected by higher values of α for a given product market.28 Thus,
the outcomes for particular product markets shift towards the lemon market, which
26Reinhart et al. (2002) compare the historical performance of ratings, as the deviation of estimated
from the realized default probability.
27E.g. Interbanking markets, CDO markets and various other markets.
28A reduction of the value of the product to (1 − x)q for the buyer and (1 − x)αq for the seller is
equivalent to a market with a market parameter αˆ > α.
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increases the impact of a rating agency on welfare generation. Especially in times
of dried up markets, as observed during the current financial crisis, rating agencies
might contribute to the reestablishment of functioning markets. Besides the increase of
asymmetric information and the lack of trust in the markets, a revaluation of products
and an adjustment of perception of risks between investors and issuers occurred and in
turn some markets broke down.
Contrary to Lizzeri’s no revelation result (Lizzeri, 1999), we are able to show that strong
incentives exist for a monopolistic rating agency to issue information to both sides of
the market. This result emerges as the rating agency can sell the same product to two
parties with different objectives and is able to discriminate in prices. The result objects
to the argument that the rating agencies mainly adapted their business model towards
the issuer-pay model to succumb to bribing by firms or other rated entities. The main
objective is profit maximization.
In our model without a certification service, two market outcomes arise: in one market
the costs of asymmetric information do not hinder investors and issuers to exchange
their products. The reservation utility of the best seller is lower than the buyers’
expected quality of all sellers and consequently all products are traded in the market;
a ’Honey Market’ is established.
In a Lemon Market, a financial intermediary can partly overcome the asymmetric infor-
mation problem, as a high proportion of potential trades is realized. The intermediary
receives a high fraction of the rents generated by the market. In the Honey Market,
the total welfare is not affected by the introduction of an intermediary, as the market
mechanism already generates the maximum welfare.
Our results demonstrate that a profit-maximizing certifier prefers to operate on the
seller’s side in a Honey Market, if she has to decide to offer the services merely to
one side of the market, while she is indifferent in a Lemon Market. Figure 5 depicts
the shares of all parties involved in the market if the certification service is offered
to the seller’s side alone and to both sides of the market. In the Lemon Market, the
entire welfare cannot be realized through certification, but a substantial proportion of
75 percent. In both markets, the certifier extracts a high amount of the potential rents,
which may rise to 50 percent of potential welfare in the lemon market. Firms gain in
the lemon market by hiring the intermediary, as they extract 25 percent of potential
welfare, which could not be realized in an alternative way. In a Honey Market, the
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intermediary does not increase welfare and the seller will be unwilling to share rents
with the intermediary in the market (ex-ante).
Figure 5: Profit shares with two-sided certification compared to one-sided.
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If the intermediary decides to sell merely to the investor’s side, its revenues shrink by
one third. It is important to notice that the traded products differ between both sales
schemes: if the seller orders a rating the best half of the firms will demand a certificate.
Whereas, if buyers order ratings they cannot differentiate between good and bad firms
and will therefore select randomly.
Comparing the outcomes of one-sided certification with the model in which the inter-
mediary sells its services to the sellers first and if they reject the offer to the buyers,
the welfare in the lemon market increases even further.29 With two-sided certification,
about 70 percent of all products are traded in equilibrium, including the third contain-
ing the highest quality. The welfare loss is approximately 20 percent compared to 100
29Relaxing the assumption of a sequential game and allowing sellers and buyers to demand a rating
simultaneously does not alter the solutions.
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percent without certification.
Figure 5 shows the slight increase of the intermediaries’ share on welfare in the Honey
Market. Compared to the 50% jump in profits from offering ratings to the firm’s side
instead of operating on investor’s side solely, the increase in profits of the intermediary
by offering the certification service on both sides in a Honey Market is only about 8%.
The profit for the intermediary is highest in the market with two-sided certification,
which is rather astonishing, since the certifier might crowd out demand by sellers in
the primary market through introducing an evaluation service on the buyer side. By
offering the certification service on both sides of the market, the intermediary faces
a negative second-order effect from sellers hoping to be rated by two buyers, which
reduces the revenues generated on the seller side for any given price. At the same time,
the average quality of non-rated sellers increases, which increases the attractiveness of
being exclusively informed for the buyers, and in turn demand for investor ratings at
any given price hikes. The model shows that the introduction of two-sided certification
seems to outweigh the negative effect of being her own competitor. Our model further
shows that a rating agency is likely to enter every asymmetric information market.
Comparing the profits between a Lemon and a Honey Market she even prefers the
Honey Market in most cases, even though the volume of trades is not affected.30 The
potential gains from trade overcompensate the trade enhancing role of the rating agency
in the Lemon Market. Appendix A.1 gives a summary report on the equilibrium values
of the main variables in the model.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes incentives of certifiers regarding their selling behavior and asso-
ciated market outcomes. In an asymmetric information framework three options are
considered: offering certification services merely to buyers or to sellers and the sale on
both sides of the market. Buyers and sellers have diverging interests when ordering
certification services. Sellers intend to induce a price competition for their good by
ordering ratings that become public information for buyers and therewith they increase
their profits. Buyers on the other hand gain from certification since they can earn an
30A small interval α ∈ [0.5; 0.54] exists in which the rating agency has higher profits in the Lemon
than in the Honey Market.
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extra information rent and are able to apply more sophisticated bidding strategies if
they are privately informed.
Two opposing effects prevail for the intermediary if she decides to offer the certification
service on both sides of the market, which dilute incentives for buyers and sellers. First,
the certifier enters into price competition with herself, since sellers might refrain from
ordering a rating, as they hope to be rated by more than one buyer. Buyers suffer
from price competition for high-quality products initiated by sellers ordering a rating
directly. Second, the certifier combines the different market features by inducing a
high-quality segment and a low-quality segment. This is due to the fact that high-
quality sellers seek to be separated from low-quality sellers. Therefore they demand
certification services at a given price. In the remaining low-quality segment, buyers try
to gain an informational advantage by randomly buying private ratings. The market
outcomes and welfare generation vary depending on the intermediary’ decision on which
side to offer the service.
The model shows that an intermediary, who offers her services solely to one side of the
market, enables trades in a market in the sense of Akerlof (1970) and thereby increases
welfare. Depending on the sales scheme, either selling merely to the buyer or merely
to the seller, the profit shares of the parties vary. The certifier maximizes its profit
by selling to the seller side in a market with high potential gains from trade and is
indifferent in a Akerlof-type market. Furthermore, we show that the profit maximizing
strategy for the rating agencies is to sell to both sides of the market. This holds
independently of the size of potential gains from trade; a business strategy observed in
the rating market since the 1970s. The welfare in markets with two-sided certification
increases, as more and also adequately priced products are traded. As the valuation of
buyers and sellers converge, the intermediary tends to generate comparatively higher
revenues on the buyers side. This revenue shift is apparent in balance sheet data as a
consequence of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
From a policy perspective, it is not necessarily the case that observing intermediaries
being paid by the issuers indicates a cooperation of the two parties or even beautifying
the default probability. In a functioning market we expect intermediaries to have a
strong tendency to offer their services to both sides of the market, with a preference
for the seller side. As a result one might argue that the presence of intermediaries in
inefficient markets, such as the Lemon Market in our model, should be strengthened,
as they are able to overcome the inefficiencies caused by asymmetrically distributed
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information. And thus, welfare increases substantially. In a Honey Market with less
asymmetric information, the intermediary is not needed for trades to occur, but the
prices of traded goods vary. The true valuation of goods, which is revealed by rat-
ing agencies is substantial to an efficient allocation of resources and mirrors a sound
reasoning for independent rating services.
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A Appendix
A.1 Summary results
Only sellers Only buyers Both sides
α > 1
2
(lemon market)
price for seller rating 1−α
2
- 16
27
(1− α)
price for buyer rating - 1−α
4
2
9
(1− α)
high-quality threshold 1
2
- 2
3
buyer’s rating probability - 1
2
1
3
profit certifier 1−α
4
1−α
4
8
27
(1− α)
profit seller 1−α
8
1−α
8
17
162
(1− α)
welfare 3
8
(1− α) 3
8
(1− α) 65
162
(1− α)
α < 1
2
(Honey Market)
price for seller rating 1
4
- 3(3−
√
5)
2(2+
√
5)
price for buyer rating - 1
12
√
5−1
4(2+
√
5)
high-quality threshold 1−α
2
- 3
4
(3−√5)
buyer’s rating probability - 1
2
1
2+
√
5
profit certifier 1
8
1
12
9−3
√
5
8+4
√
5
profit seller 1−α
2
− 1
8
1−α
2
− 1
12
1−α
2
− 9−3
√
5
8+4
√
5
welfare 1−α
2
1−α
2
1−α
2
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B Appendix Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows directly from the text.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof follows directly from the text.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
(a) A seller will order a rating if (1 − α)q − ps ≥ 0. As the left-hand-side increases
in q the threshold level q¯ of being indifferent to ordering a rating is determined by
(1− α)q¯ − ps = 0, which yields q¯(ps) = ps1−α .
(b) A seller will order a rating if (1−α)q−ps ≥ 12 q¯−αq. As the left-hand-side increases in
q the threshold level q¯ of being indifferent to ordering a rating is determined by solving
(1− α)q¯ − ps = 12 q¯ − αq for q¯, which yields q¯(ps) = 2ps.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
(a) The maximization problem of the certifier is given by:
max
ps
ΠC(ps) = (1− q¯(ps))ps. (1)
Plugging the result of Lemma 2(a) into the profit function yields the profit ΠC depend-
ing solely on ps as:
ΠC(ps) = ps(1− ps
1− α). (2)
Maximizing w.r.t. ps yields ps =
1−α
2
and hence, q¯ = 1
2
with a corresponding profit of
the certifier of ΠC =
1−α
4
. The sellers in the quality interval [q¯, 1] order a rating and
subsequently sell their product for price q in the first price sealed bid auction. Hence,
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their profit in this segment is:
ΠS =
1∫
1
2
(1− α)qdq − 1− α
4
=
1− α
8
. (3)
As the lower segment is not traded in the Lemon Market overall realized welfare adds
up to W = 3
8
(1 − α) and a rent of Wmax − W = 1−α8 is lost due to asymmetrically
distributed information.
(b) The maximization problem of the certifier is given by:
max
ps
ΠC(ps) = (1− q¯(ps))ps. (4)
Plugging the result of Lemma 2(b) into the profit function gives the profit ΠC depending
solely on ps as
ΠC(ps) = ps(1− 2ps). (5)
Maximizing w.r.t. ps yields ps =
1
4
, and hence, q¯ = 1
2
with a corresponding profit
ΠC =
1
8
. The remainder of the market (quality interval [0, q¯]) is traded without a rating
at a price of q¯
2
= 1
4
. As all products are traded in this market the seller’s profit is:
ΠS = Wmax − ΠC = 1− α
2
− 1
8
(6)
.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof for unequally informed buyers in a Honey Market is shown in Weverbergh
(1979). The remaining proofs follow directly from the text.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4
(a) A single informed buyer in a Lemon Market receives the investment object for a
price of αq in the auction with a probability of 1. Hence, the payoff for a product
of quality q is (1 − α)q. As expected quality in this market is qe = 1
2
, the ex-ante
expectation for the value of being exclusively informed is V Lib = (1− α)qe = 1−α2 .
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(b) As the informed buyer bids 1
2
q in the auction and the uniformed randomizes the
latter sometimes wins. The probability of winning the object for the informed buyer
depends on q and is defined as F (1
2
q) = q. Therefore, the expected payoff (ex-post) for
the informed bidder is F (1
2
q)(1 − 1
2
)q = 1
2
q2. Hence, the ex-ante expectation for the
value of being exclusively informed is
V Eib =
1∫
0
1
2
q2dq =
1
6
. (7)
B.7 Proof of Lemma 5
(a) As the buyers are indifferent to ordering a rating or staying uninformed in the
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium the probability ω of ordering a rating is given by:
(1− ω)V Lib − pb = 0. (8)
Using Lemma 4(a) we obtain (1− ω)1−α
2
− pb = 0 and solving for ω results in ω(pb) =
1− 2pb
1−α .
(b) Applying the same logic and using Lemma 4(b), we obtain
(1− ω)V Eib − pb = 0⇔ (1− ω)
1
6
− pb = 0. (9)
Solving for ω yields ω(pb) = 1− 6pb.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 3
(a) The maximization problem of the certifier is given by:
max
pb
ΠC(pb) = (ω(pb))
22pb + 2ω(pb)(1− ω(pb))pb. (10)
The profit function can be simplified to ΠC(pb) = 2ω(pb)pb. Plugging the result of
Lemma 5 (a) into the profit function yields ΠC(pb) = 2pb − 4p
2
b
1−α . Maximizing w.r.t.
price pb gives pb =
1−α
4
. This leads to ω = 1
2
and thus, the certifier’s profit is ΠC =
1−α
4
.
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In the Lemon Market, sellers only realize gains if the information on their quality is
known to both buyers. In ω2 = 1
4
of the cases the expected profit is (1−α)
2
and hence
the overall seller profit is 1−α
8
. The accumulated welfare adds up to W = 3
8
(1− α).
(b) The maximization problem of the certifier is given by:
max
pb
ΠC(pb) = (ω(pb))
22pb + 2ω(pb)(1− ω(pb))pb. (11)
The profit function can be simplified to ΠC(pb) = 2ω(pb)pb. Plugging the result of
Lemma 5 (b) into the profit function we obtain ΠC(pb) = 2pb−12p2b . Maximizing w.r.t.
pb yields pb =
1
12
. This leads to ω = 1
2
and thus, the certifier’s profit is ΠC =
1
12
. As
all projects are realized in the Honey Market it turns out that the profit of the seller is
ΠS =
1−α
2
− 1
12
and the realized welfare is W = Wmax.
B.9 Proof of Corollary 6
The proof follows directly from the text.
B.10 Proof of Lemma 8
The proof follows directly from the text.
B.11 Proof of Lemma 8
For the entire proof we assume q¯II to be fixed. Let Gq¯II (q) denote the uniform distri-
bution on the interval [0, q¯II ] with corresponding density function gq¯II (q) =
1
q¯II
.
(a) The probability of winning the auction for the informed bidder is 1. The quality
remaining un-certified in the market is distributed according to Gq¯II (q). In expectation
the informed buyer wins an object of quality q¯II
2
for a bid of α q¯II
2
and hence realizes an
expected profit of V Lib (q¯II) = (1− α) q¯II2 .
(b) Let the object in the auction be of a quality q. By bidding 1
2
q the informed buyer
wins with a probability of Fq¯II (
1
2
q) = q
q¯II
. If he wins his payoff is q − 1
2
q = 1
2
q. Thus,
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payoff ex-ante is determined by
V Hib (q¯II) =
q¯II∫
0
q
q¯II
1
2
qdGq¯II (q) =
q¯II∫
0
q
q¯2II
1
2
qdq =
1
q¯2II
1
6
q3
∣∣q¯II
0
=
1
6
q¯II . (12)
B.12 Proof of Lemma 9
(a) As the buyers are indifferent to ordering a rating or staying uninformed in the
unique mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability of ordering a rating is given by:
(1− ω)V Lib (ps, pb)− pb = 0 (13)
Using Lemma 8(a) we obtain (1 − ω)(1 − α) q¯II(ps,pb)
2
− pb = 0 and solving for ω gives
ω(ps, pb) = 1− 2pb(1−α)q¯II(ps,pb) .
(b) Applying the same logic and using Lemma 8 (b) we obtain
(1− ω)V Hib (ps, pb)− pb = 0⇔ (1− ω)
1
6
q¯II(ps, pb)− pb = 0. (14)
Solving for ω yields ω(ps, pb) = 1− 6pbq¯II(ps,pb) .
B.13 Proof of Lemma 10
(a) A seller will order a rating if:
(1− α)q − ps ≥ (ω(ps, pb))2(1− α)q. (15)
As the left-hand-side increases faster in q, the threshold level of the seller being indif-
ferent is determined by the condition
(1− α)q¯II − ps ≥ (ω(ps, pb))2(1− α)q¯II . (16)
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Plugging the result of Lemma 9 (a) into (16) and solving for q¯II , gives
q¯II(ps, pb) =
4p2b
(1− α)(4pp − ps) (17)
(b) To determine the seller’s indifference condition, we need the expected winning bid in
case that only one buyer ordered a rating given quality q and given the upper threshold
q¯II , denoted as E[bwin|q, q¯II ]. With a probability of Fq¯II (12q) = qq¯II , the informed bidder
wins with a bid of 1
2
q. With a probability of 1 − q
q¯II
, the uninformed wins with an
expected bid of
1
2
q+ 1
2
q¯II
2
= 1
4
(q + q¯II). Thus,
E[bwin|q, q¯II ] = q
q¯II
· 1
2
q + (1− q
q¯II
) · 1
4
(q + q¯II) =
1
4
q¯II +
q2
4q¯II
. (18)
A seller will order a rating if:
(1− α)q − ps ≥(ω(ps, pb))2(1− α)q
+ 2ω(ps, pb)(1− ω(ps, pb))(E[bwin|q, q¯II ]− αq)
+ (1− ω(ps, pb))2(1
2
− α)q¯II .
(19)
Again, the left-hand-side increases faster in q. The quality threshold q¯II is determined
by replacing all q by q¯II and thereby replacing E[bwin|q, q¯II ] by E[bwin|q¯II , q¯II ] = 12 q¯II
which yields
(1− α)q¯II − ps =(ω(ps, pb))2(1− α)q¯II
+ 2ω(ps, pb)(1− ω(ps, pb))(1
2
− α)q¯II .
(20)
This can be reformulated to
(1− (ω(ps, pb))2) q¯II
2
= ps. (21)
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Plugging the result of Lemma 9 (b) into (21) and solving for q¯II yields:
q¯II(ps, pb) =
18p2b
6pb − ps (22)
B.14 Proof of Proposition 4
(a) The maximization problem of the certifier is given by:
max
ps,pb
ΠC(ps, pb) =(1− q¯II(ps, pb))ps + q¯II(ps, pb)[(ω(ps, pb))22pb
+ 2ω(ps, pb)(1− ω)(ps, pb)pb].
(23)
The profit function can be simplified to
ΠC(ps, pb) = ps + q¯II(ps, pb)[2ω(ps, pb)pb − ps].
By plugging the results of Lemma 9(a) and Lemma 10(a) into the profit function of the
certifier we obtain a profit function given by
ΠC(ps, pb) = ps − 8p
3
b
(1− α)(4pb − ps) . (24)
Maximizing the profit function w.r.t. ps and pb, we finally obtain ps =
16
27
(1 − α) and
pb =
2
9
(1 − α). The derived functions for ω and for q¯II imply q¯II = 23 and ω = 13 .
The profit for the certifier is ΠC =
8
27
(1 − α). In the market segment with a quality
parameter below q¯II a share of 1−
(
2
3
)2
= 5
9
of all available products is traded. Hence,
the overall welfare adds up to:
W =
5
9
2
3∫
0
(1− α)qdq +
1∫
2
3
(1− α)qdq = (1− α) 65
162
. (25)
As buyers do not make any profit in equilibrium, the seller’s profit yields
ΠF = W − ΠC = (1− α) 17
162
.
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(b) The maximization problem of the certifier is given by:
max
ps,pb
ΠC(ps, pb) =(1− q¯II(ps, pb))ps + q¯II(ps, pb)[(ω(ps, pb))22pb
+ 2ω(ps, pb)(1− ω(ps, pb))pb].
(26)
Again, the profit function can be simplified to
ΠC = ps + q¯II(ps, pb)[2ω(ps, pb)pb − ps]
.
Plugging the results of Lemma 9(b) and Lemma 10(b) into the profit function we end
up with the following maximization problem:
max
ps,pb
ΠC(ps, pb) = ps − 6p2b
6pb + ps
6pb − ps s.t.0 ≤ ω, q¯II ≤ 1 (27)
Hereby, the boundary conditions on ω and q¯II need to be fulfilled. Using the expressions
for the two parameters derived above, the constraints are equivalent to
3pb ≤ ps ≤ 6pb − 18p2b . (28)
In the following we show that an interior optimum exists. Taking the derivative of the
profit function with respect to pb gives a single non-negative root which is pb =
1
12
(ps+
5
√
ps). Plugging this into the first derivative of the profit function with respect to ps
and solving the FOC for ps gives ps =
3(3−
√
5)
2(2+
√
5)
. Using this in the expression for pb yields
pb =
√
5−1
4(2+
√
5)
. Calculating the certifier’s profit using optimal prices yields ΠC =
9−3
√
5
8+4
√
5
.
The profit is higher than in either case of one-sided certification (Proposition 2(b) and
Proposition 3(b)), hence (28) is not binding. The induced quality threshold and the
rating probability are calculated using Lemma 10(b) and Lemma 9(b), which yield
q¯II =
3
4
(3−√5) and ω = 1
2+
√
5
, respectively.
As buyers do not make any profit in equilibrium the seller’s profit yields
ΠS = W − ΠC = 1− α
2
− 9− 3
√
5
8 + 4
√
5
. (29)
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